Introduction
The current debt crisis in the Heavily Indebted and Poor Countries (HIPC) is a long lasting phenomenon that hindered economic growth due to increasing bilateral loans and concessional lending, lack of macroeconomic adjustments and structural reforms in poor countries, and a number of exogenous domestic and international shocks. As a result of this adverse scenario, these countries started accumulating external debt reaching extreme ratios of debt to GDP and exports in the nineties (Figure 1 .1).
At the beginning of the seventies HIPCs had, on average, a level of external debt equal to total exports and to around a fourth of gross domestic product. By the end of the eighties, the stock of debt became equal to the annual GDP and to more than five times exports, notwithstanding the extensive use of nonconcessional flow reschedulings granted by the informal group of sovereign bilateral creditor (Paris Club). The increasing external debt was seen as unsustainable and determined a number of debt relief initiatives that were introduced during the late 1980s and the 1990s (Toronto, London, Naples and Lyon terms), according to which bilateral donors agreed to rescheduling on concessional terms and introducing the option of stock-of-debt cancellation (see Daseking and Powell, 1999 , for a detailed discussion of the history of debt relief).
By contrast, multilateral development banks and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) resisted § I wish to thank Marco Arnone for the useful discussions on debt relief and the participants to the XI meeting of the "Associazione degli Economisti di Lingua Neolatina" (San Benedetto, Italy). The usual disclaimers apply.
recommendations to provide debt relief on their concessional loans and maintained their status of preferred creditors, according to which payments of multilateral debt takes priority over private and bilateral debt. In those years, the stock of external debt kept growing and, at its peak, the level of external debt in the whole sample of HIPCs reached 152 percent of GDP (in 1994) and 663 percent of exports (in 1993) . As a result, Non Government Organizations (NGOs) and some sovereign lenders (notably, the UK, the Netherlands and Scandinavian countries) put growing pressures on multilateral institutions and western donors to increase debt relief efforts and extend debt reduction to multilateral loans.
Figure 1.1: External Debt in HIPCs
The IMF and the World Bank (WB) were initially reluctant arguing that debt relief was not necessary neither affordable and that it could generate moral hazard and undermine IMF conditionality (Evans, 1999; Teunissen, 2004) . Nevertheless, under increasing political pressure from their major shareholders, in 1996 the 'sister institutions' endorsed the debt relief policy and launched the Heavily Indebted Poor Country Initiative, which was enhanced in 1999 in order to provide faster debt relief to a larger number of countries. Finally, in 2005, donors pledged to cancel the whole debt held by the International Development Association of the WB, the IMF and the African Development Fund of the countries that have reached the completion point under the Enhanced Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative (in December 2006 also the Inter-American Development Bank agreed on the 100 percent debt relief). Thanks to these efforts, external debt ratios started declining from their peaks and, especially because of the steep reduction occurred in the last five years, in 2006 the average external debt to GDP ratio reached 45 percent and the ratio over exports declined to 150 percent, the threshold which was identified as the sustainable level of debt under the HIPC Initiative.
The various debt relief initiatives of the last decades were only partially successful in reducing external debt dependence in poor countries, increasing poverty reduction and social expenditures, and putting heavily indebted countries on a debt sustainable path. Results in terms of higher investments and enhanced economic growth are instead less evident (Easterly 2002; Depetris Chauvin and Kraay 2005; Presbitero 2009 ). In any case, the positive results obtained by the efforts coordinated by the International Financial Institutions cannot be taken for granted and there are many sources of vulnerability, such as rising domestic debt (Arnone and Presbitero 2007) and the predatory role of new lenders and vulture funds lawsuits, which take advantage of the lack of coordination and binding agreements amongst donors and of the borrowing space created by the HIPC Initiative and by the MDRI (Arnone and Presbitero 2008) . On the top of that, external exogenous shocks, such ad windfalls in the commodity prices, are always a threat to poverty reduction policies and debt sustainability.
Dealing with one exogenous adverse external shock at a time is generally a difficult challenge for poor countries, because of limited fiscal space, few policy options and scarce debt management capacity.
The current financial crisis, because of its unprecedented severity and global scale, forces poor countries to deal with multiple exogenous shocks simultaneously: mitigating the effects of a reduction in trade, capital inflows and foreign assistance is going to be a very hard task and to require a massive intervention by donors and by the International Financial Institutions (IFI), in order to avoid to jeopardize the progresses done so far. In the following, we try to spell out the way in which the global economic-financial crisis has affected and still weighs on Low-Income Countries (LIC), focusing on overall debt sustainability. Section 2 points out the transmission channels of the global financial crisis to LIC; Section 3 discusses the policy options of poor countries and the response by the IFI; Section 4 assesses the possibility that the current financial turmoil triggers another debt crisis in HIPCs, and Section 5 concludes.
The Channels Through Which the Crisis Affects Low Income Countries
Although the epicenter of the current turmoil is the financial industry of the richest countries and the recession is hitting harder in Europe and the United States, it is becoming clearer over time that dramatic long-run consequences are likely to be suffered by low income countries. Even if poor countries are not so directly interconnected to the world financial system, so that they can escape the direct contagion channel, they are exposed to many other sources of vulnerability and lack the appropriate resources and instruments to face the crisis 1 . Thus, the impact of the financial turmoil is extremely heterogeneous among poor countries, depending on their economic structure, external dependence and institutional framework (de Velde 2009). Nonetheless, there are different common indirect channels through which the current financial turmoil and the recession in the rich world could affect poor countries (Mold et al. 2009; International Monetary Fund 2009a) 2 .
The most important source of vulnerability is the critical dependence of poor countries on export revenues and their narrow export base, since commodities still account for about 70 percent of LIC exports. Thus, the sharp decline in the world demand following the crisis has dramatic consequences on the volume of exports. Moreover, the fall in commodity prices, that is reversing the upward trend of recent years which helped sustaining Africa's growth rates, has to be taken into account. The most recent IMF projections (International Monetary Fund 2009a) show a sharp fall in exports, from 26.6 to 21.8 percent of GDP and a deterioration in the terms of trade. The fall in the price of copper, in example, is dramatically hurting the economy of Zambia, whose foreign exchange earnings are generated for three quarters by copper mining: some large investment projects are put on hold, poverty 1 By contrast, the bailout of the financial industry in OECD countries is going to cost a huge amount of public money. Even a tiny percentage of it could have been spent, according to a number of scholars and NGOs, on a number of different aid programs (i.e. the 700 billion dollars program originally proposed to bail out Wall Street is about seven fold the global level of annual official development assistance). See below and section 2 for a discussion about aid flows and fiscal stimulus in poor countries. Poor countries are also dramatically exposed to the contraction in world remittances, which, other than supporting household consumption and subsistence expenditures, finance investment and stimulate economic growth (Giuliano and Ruiz Arranz 2009; Bettin and Zazzaro 2008) . On the whole, remittances are the second source of external finance in developing countries and account for twice the inflows of aid. In some countries, remittances account for up to more than 20 percent of output and they are even more important than aid flows. In recent years, remittances inflows grew at double-digit annual rate, being around seven percent of GDP in the average Sub-Saharan Africa country, and more than 12 percent in Latin America. According to the World Bank estimates (Ratha and Mohapatra 2009), the crisis will induce a contraction in remittances flows to the developing world from 5 to 8 percent in 2009. However, remittances would remain more resilient than other sources of capital inflows in developing countries, given that private debt, equity flows and foreign direct investment are expected to decline at a sharper pace. Udell 2001; Detragiache, Tressel and Gupta 2008) . Moreover, during a financial crisis multinational banks are likely to recur to internal capital markets to rein in their credit supply in order to focus on the home country market, transmitting the home country financial shock to the host country (Peek and Rosengren 1997; Van Rijckeghem and Weder, 2000 
The Financing Gap and the Responses by the International Financial Institutions
Thus, because of poor countries' dependence on exports, foreign aid and capital flows, the current recession is likely to have dramatic effects for the world's poorest, especially in Sub-Saharan Africa.
The United Nations (2009) stresses how the financial crisis is jeopardizing the achievements of the Millennium Development Goals. Poverty ratios, indicators of hunger, children malnutrition, gender equality, unemployment, they all worsened in 2008. Therefore, developing countries will need additional financial assistance to reverse this recent trend. However, the expected lower levels of aid would not only impede future progresses, but also reverse some of the gains already obtained.
According to a number of different estimates provided by international organizations and by NGOs, developing countries are going to face a financing gap of around USD 140-700 billion, depending on the severity of the crisis, the policy responses and the materializing of different scenarios. The IMF estimates that LIC will have to deal with a balance of payment negative shock of around USD 165 billion, resulting from a fall in exports, FDI, remittances and from adverse price food and fuel changes.
Once taken into account the loss in reserves, this shock will result in additional financing needs of about USD 25 billion in 2009. A "bad case" scenario, in which a number of shocks happen simultaneously, is also simulated and, in this case, total financing needs for LIC will amount to USD 138 billion. Focusing on the whole sample of developing countries, the World Bank estimate that in 2009 many countries (between 59 and 69) will find it difficult to meet external financing needs, estimated at one trillion dollars. While the overall financing gap in 2009 should be between USD 350 billion to USD 635 billion, in Sub-Saharan Africa external financing needs will amount to around USD 150 billion, mainly due to current account deficits, and the financing gap is estimated to be less than USD 100 billion.
The severity of the crisis in LIC is harshened by the national governments' lack of appropriate tools to face the crisis. Apart from few poor countries which were able to accumulate stock of international reserves or to reduce public debt in last years, the majority of developing countries, contrary to the . Eventually, in developing countries with a recent record of central bank independence, a fiscal expansion could result in financing deficits with money creation, loosing the hard-gained credibility and threatening the pursuit of price stability (Reinhart and Reinhart 2009 we will discuss in the next Section, the current crisis is severely affecting debt dynamics, so that many countries in the next years can be more vulnerable to fiscal deficits and will have limited scope for expansionary policies, especially if donor assistance will not be scaled up. Anyway, some Sub-Saharan African countries could actually implement discretionary fiscal stimulus to sustain aggregate demand, giving priority to the financing of social safety nets programs. Nevertheless, fiscal policies should consider the specific economic and financial characteristics of Sub-Saharan African countries: limited access to international capital markets and thin domestic financial markets, in fact, could make fiscal policy less effective and might lead to a crowding out of private investment (Berg et al. 2009 ).
Given the limited room for counter cyclical policies, the role of donors and of the international community in poor countries becomes fundamental. With the unfolding of the crisis, the World Bank and the IMF have developed different strategies aimed at mitigating the effects of the global recession, improving the lending capacity and the pool of resources available to LIC.
The economic crisis and the subsequent higher demand for funds from poor countries has forced the IMF to undertake a substantial revision of its lending instruments to poor countries and to double its borrowing limits, in order to meet the increased needs of LIC, which are severely hit by rising food and oil prices and by the global downturn 
• The Extended Credit Facility (ECF). This facility, the successor to the PRGF, will allow the Fund to provide sustained program engagement and financing for countries facing protracted balance of payments difficulties.
• supporting a "Vulnerability Fund", calling for the developed countries to dedicate the 0.7 percent of their economic stimulus packages to a fund which should provide financial assistance to developing countries suffering for the global downturn which can not afford bailouts and fiscal deficits.
Another Debt Crisis?
The Increasing financing requirements, coupled with a (possible) decline in international aid is going to push developing countries to finance their deficits borrowing abroad or issuing domestic debt. The rise in external (domestic) lending will increase public debt ratios and will have adverse consequences on the economy. External and domestic lending is becoming more expensive because of the rise in interest rates, which follows the withdraw of foreign investors from poor countries, and the decline in domestic savings. Even countries which were able to access the international financial markets are affected by the liquidity shortage: other than Ghana, also Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda have put on hold their debut Eurobond until market conditions improve. Moreover, the outflows of capital are putting downward pressures on the exchange rates increasing the cost of foreign currency denominated external (and domestic) debt. Subsequently, the rising cost of debt service will worsen the fiscal deficit even further, generating a vicious cycle.
As argued by many commentators, this time many poor countries can cope with the crisis starting from better initial conditions than in the past, thanks to sounder fiscal positions, reduced debt burdens, lower inflation, and comfortable reserve cushions. Nevertheless, those same countries have already been hit by the 2007-2008 food crisis (which is still not over), are still afflicted by widespread poverty, food insecurity, fragility and conflict, and their initial conditions are highly heterogeneous, especially between oil exporter and importer
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. With a number of countries with debt ratios close to the 60 (150) percent of GDP (exports) thresholds and at moderate or high risk of debt distress, the projected rise in financing requirements could undermine the positive achievements of debt reduction policies. Debt ratios could quickly bounce back to their pre-debt relief levels, given that the global crisis is adversely affecting both the nominator and the denominator of the debt ratio. Public debt is increasing because of a quantity effect (more lending), but also because of a price effect (in case of foreign currency denominated debt), which works through the depreciation of the exchange rate. By contrast, the denominator, being either exports or GDP, is declining as a result of the global recession and the fall in world trade. In addition, the value of exports has diminished due to the fall in commodity prices, which has worsened the terms of trade in many LIC. The stress tests run under the Debt Sustainability Framework (DSF) contemplate neither multiple adverse external shocks nor one of a such magnitude.
Therefore, new ad-hoc simulations and specific policy responses are required.
At the moment, as data are released and projections updated, the decline in exports and GDP is actually worse than expected, exposing many poor countries to a severe shock which could bring them to an unsustainable debt path. That we are still in the midst of the crisis, at least for LIC, has been recently confirmed by the managing director of the IMF, who in a speech delivered in September said that low income countries are being hit by the crisis harder than the IMF thought in March (Dominique StraussKahn 2009). In Table 1 Hence, given uncertain borrowing policy and with limited liquidity facilities by the IFI to help countries to go through (hopefully) temporary liquidity problems, vulnerable countries are going to face aggravated risks of future debt distress episodes. In addition to that, this scenario could undermine past and current debt relief efforts made by the international community and it could weaken povertyreduction and development policies. Large external debts hinders economic growth in poor countries through the so-called debt overhang effect and the crowding out of investment due to excessive debt service payments (Clements, Bhattacharya and Nguyen 2003; Cordella, Ricci and Ruiz Arranz 2009; Presbitero 2006 and 2008) . Moreover, is has been also shown that since 2000 debt relief has been able to achieve some results and free resources from the budget to invest in social infrastructure and poverty-reduction (Presbitero 2009 ). Therefore, an increase in debt ratios and public debt service might reduce, or even wipe out, the progresses achieved so far, scaling down public investments and pro-poor spending and endangering economic growth.
Concluding remarks
At the time of writing, many emerging markets have already started growing close to pre-crisis rates, while OECD countries have the resources and the instrument to cope with the current financial crisis and mitigate its effects on displaced workers and the poor. By contrast, the poorest countries are still well below their trend of output growth and lack the appropriate tools to deal with these multiple external shocks. Thus, the poorest people in the poorest countries are the most exposed to the global recession: not only they lack sufficient safety nets for immediate help but also, more importantly, they are going be dramatically affected in the long run by the likely reduction in social spending. A new generation of poor might not benefit from the recent (limited) progress in education and health, with To address this potentially tragic situation, the rich world and the IFI should reshape their policy agenda, focusing much more attention and providing more resources and assistance to low-income countries. Some recent steps made by the Multilateral Institutions, such as the "Vulnerability to Africa are re-stated, but it is still unclear when the promised additional resources will become 12 Harper et al. (2009) discuss the effect of the crisis on children, stressing their vulnerability and the irreversible long-run effects of child malnutrition, infant mortality and school dropout on future poverty rates, inequality and economic growth. The author report data from a previous study suggesting that a one percent decrease in per capita GDP has been linked to an increase in infant mortality of between 17 and 44 per thousand children born.
available, especially now that the crisis is severely affecting government budgets.
Even from a self-interested point of view, the rich world should realize that it is in its own interest to help developing countries to cope with the crisis. The threat of another debt crisis, rising political instability and social unrest which generally follow a severe economic downturn (Miguel, Satyanath and and Sergenti 2004) , not to mention the increase in transnational criminal activities, should be sound and economically rational arguments to urge rich countries to scale up their involvement in low-income countries.
